How To Succeed in Cyberspace by Anderson, Tom et al.
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Anderson, Tom and Arief, Budi and Basit, Tehmina and Borup, Rosie and Rutherford, Louise
 (2015) How To Succeed in Cyberspace.    In: 8th Annual International Conference of Education,
Research and Innovation (ICERI), NOV 16-20, 2015, Seville, Spain.
DOI
WOS:000377304006024
Link to record in KAR
http://kar.kent.ac.uk/58706/
Document Version
Author's Accepted Manuscript
HOW TO SUCCEED IN CYBERSPACE 
T Anderson1, B Arief1, TN Basit2, R Borup2, L Rutherford2 
1Newcastle University (UK) 
tom.anderson@ncl.ac.uk, budi.arief@ncl.ac.uk 
2Staffordshire University (UK) 
t.n.basit@staffs.ac.uk, r.borup@staffs.ac.uk, louise.rutherford@staffs.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Cyberspace is a very real man-made environment. Like any physical realm, while it offers potential for 
progress and benefits, it also offers opportunities for misconduct, and cyber criminals and cyber 
terrorists are continually searching out weaknesses in the defences that have been erected against 
them. There is one weakness that is pervasive across society: our individual lack of awareness, and of 
how to protect ourselves and our organisations against cyber attack. This paper reports on an EU 
funded project called SUCCEED (Shaping University Curricula to Critical Infrastructure Employer 
Needs) which seeks to reduce that vulnerability through education; specifically, we want to advise 
Higher Education Institutions of measures by which curricula can be augmented to ensure that all 
graduates have an appropriate level of cyber savvy. The paperÕs structure reflects the projectÕs 
straightforward approach: first we identified what is needed in terms of knowledge and understanding 
of how to be protected in cyberspace; second we examined current provision (primarily to identify 
gaps, but also to refer to best-practice); third we will outline recommendations based on our findings 
from the first and second phases; and fourth we will have these recommendations validated by 
relevant stakeholders (including representatives from industry, government organisations and 
academia) in order to distil our conclusions, which will be disseminated and exploited further as final 
contributions of the project. This paper presents current progress of the SUCCEED project, in 
particular the results and findings obtained from the first two phases of the project. This is a relatively 
modest project, and will not claim to provide a definitive solution. However, we believe it can provide 
an important first step towards an enrichment of curricula that will better prepare graduates to cope 
with the dangers and risks from terrorists and cyber criminals in the digital future they will all 
participate in. Only thus can they SUCCEED in cyberspace, by staying safe and secure in the digital 
realm Ð through education. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Cyberspace is a very real man-made environment, supported by colossal investment in digital 
resources. Unfortunately, that cyber reality Ð like the physical realm Ð provides manifold opportunities 
for misconduct, ranging from relatively petty theft to massive fraud, from dubious pornography to 
facilitating sexual offence against children, from overwriting a website to disrupting critical national 
infrastructure. 
As well as providing immense benefits to society (and these benefits continue to grow, year after year) 
the exponential increases in computing power (in terms of speed and storage, as well as of networked 
interconnections [1]) also give new avenues for malicious acts to criminals and terrorists [2]. These 
cyber criminals and cyber terrorists are continually searching out weaknesses in the defences that 
have been erected against them, such as encryption, firewalls and passwords, but there is one 
weakness that is pervasive across society: our individual lack of awareness, and of how to protect 
ourselves and our organisations against cyber attack. 
The threat of physical or cyber attack targeting major infrastructure is indeed a key concern globally. 
Vulnerability to sudden service disruptions due to deliberate sabotage and terrorist attack is a major 
threat [3]. The Òtaken for grantedÓ security of various infrastructure systems has evolved into a new 
discipline, Critical Infrastructure Protection, as a result of the 9/11 attacks in the USA [4]. This is even 
more pertinent now, given the subsequent terrorist attacks that have occurred throughout the world 
over the last decade. Critical infrastructure comprises goods and services such as clean air; the 
supply of water, electricity and gas; schools and hospitals; roads and bridges; railways and airports; 
telephone and the Internet; information and communication; banking and finance; emergency 
services; sewage and refuse disposal, and many others. The concept of critical infrastructure 
protection and security is associated with the capability to defend against Ð and capacity and 
readiness to respond to Ð serious incidents encompassing the critical infrastructure of a nation or 
region; infrastructure that is crucial for the wellbeing and safety of nation states.  
While individual infrastructure systems provide unique services, it is important to consider the 
interdependencies between infrastructures, because the failure of one could lead to the collapse of 
many others, with the potential to close down multiple crucial services. For example, a physical attack 
on an electricity grid can lead to the failure of a number of other services such as in hospitals, railways 
and airports. Similarly, a cyber attack on telecommunication networks could have a deleterious impact 
on police and emergency services. 
Thus critical infrastructure denotes a wide array of resources that are necessary for the functioning of 
social, economic, political and cultural systems of a nation [5]. Due to the scale and complexity of the 
critical infrastructure required to operate in contemporary society, such infrastructures are vulnerable 
to both physical and cyber threats [6]. It is clear, and widely acknowledged, that a disruption to such 
resources can cause loss of life, damage to property, and substantial economic costs. While the threat 
is very real, the prevention and protection of critical assets is often only viewed as the responsibility of 
governments, and little emphasis is placed on educating our citizens to identify, report, and deal with 
actual or potential physical or cyber security risks. Nevertheless, education and training have a clear 
role in helping to detect and prevent threats to critical infrastructure and thus avert (or mitigate) later 
catastrophes. 
The wide-ranging use and scope of information and communication technology today makes critical 
infrastructure vulnerable to cyber as well as physical attacks. Even infrastructure not considered as 
under threat, such as domain names, can pose security risks [7]. Lewis et al. [8] note that the 
European Commission (EU) has initiated a network comprising research and technology organisations 
within the EU with expertise in critical infrastructure, starting with preparatory studies in 2009-2010. 
They go on to explain the extent of work that has been carried out so far in this area. Focusing on the 
US context, Biringer et al. [9] contend that strategies to reduce risks relating to Critical Infrastructure 
Protection and Security (CIPS) conventionally focus on minimising the likelihood of undesirable events 
by improving the effectiveness of security and protection to mitigate vulnerabilities. They nevertheless 
argue that it is not possible to prevent all undesirable events, and resilient systems should be 
designed to ensure swift recovery of critical infrastructure. 
In August 2014, the UK national threat level was raised from ÔsubstantialÕ to ÔsevereÕ, signifying that 
terrorist activity is considered Ôhighly likelyÕ in the UK. British citizens and businesses have been 
warned to be ÔvigilantÕ. It is important that individuals and companies be educated to learn to deal with 
threats to personal and organisational security. Evidently, universities have a role to play in helping 
businesses and government agencies to protect their people, property and data systems. 
This paper presents a report on an EU funded project called SUCCEED (Shaping University Curricula 
to Critical Infrastructure Employer Needs Ð http://www.succeed-eu.uk/). The SUCCEED project seeks 
to reduce by means of better education the current societal vulnerability resulting from a lack of 
awareness of cyber threats and terrorism; specifically, we want to advise Higher Education Institutions 
(HEIs) of measures by which curricula in all disciplines can be augmented to ensure that all graduates 
have an appropriate level of cyber savvy. By ensuring that there is a thorough understanding of how 
HEIs can contribute (based on research and consultation with key employers), HE curricula can be 
developed in a planned, strategic manner, ideally leading to a cross-faculty, coherent delivery 
capability across all undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. When it is germane, we will report 
more generally on opportunities for specialist training, specific technology needs, or for appropriate 
further research. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we give an overview of the 
SUCCEED project, summarising the four planned phases (of which the first two are now almost 
complete), and the methodology that those phases have adopted. Section 3 presents our results to 
date, which are largely complete for the first phase, and constitute our interim findings from phase 2. 
The final section gives a preliminary recommendation and sketches the opportunities for further work. 
2 THE SUCCEED PROJECT 
The SUCCEED project aims to help tackle issues related to cyber security and terrorism through 
education and partnership. By sharing the project outcomes with target groups Ð such as HEIs, critical 
infrastructure organisations, government agencies, relevant public and private sector companies Ð the 
project hopes to ensure that future university graduates are able to contribute positively to the cyber 
security and/or counter terrorism strategies of their place of work. 
To achieve this aim, four main phases of work have been defined: 
1. Ask relevant employers to tell us what, and how, universities can contribute towards both the 
prevention of, and preparedness for, acts of cybercrime and terrorism, with regard to providing 
guidance for the future workforce (Needs). 
2. Carry out a university-wide, cross-discipline curriculum investigation and mapping exercise to find 
out what is already taking place and what is missing (Gaps). 
3. Improve the ways universities support organisations to protect people, property and data, through 
a set of recommendations based on the evidence gathered and lessons learned from our research 
(Recommendations). 
4. Validate our recommendations against real-world expertise through consultation and 
dissemination to maximise impact (Validation, Dissemination and Exploitation) 
 
 
Figure 1. The main phases of the SUCCEED project 
Fig. 1 provides a diagrammatical representation of the main phases of the work planned in the 
SUCCEED project, which will be described in more detail in Section 2.1. At the time of writing, the first 
two phases of the project (Needs and Gaps) have been largely completed, hence this paper will give a 
detailed report on these phases, while outlining how the other two phases will be conducted in our 
future work. 
There are three main research questions that the SUCCEED project seeks to address: 
RQ 1. What issues are businesses and government agencies concerned with regarding the 
protection of their people, property and data systems? 
RQ 2. How can companies and agencies improve the way they prepare, prevent and manage the 
consequences of internal and external threats to security?  
RQ 3. How can Universities contribute to the security of different organisations through 
education, research, or development of new products and services? 
These research questions drive the approach and methodology taken in the project, which will be 
described in detail in Section 2.2 below. 
2.1 Four Phases of the SUCCEED Project 
2.1.1 Needs 
In our first phase we held four workshops involving employers from a range of commercial and public 
sectors. Group exercises involving a number of challenging scenarios were used to extract key areas 
of concern and priorities from the participants, and we analysed the results to create a weighted 
enumeration of what were regarded as the most significant issues. To gain added benefit we also 
sought to summarise what were perceived as common organisational weaknesses and desiderata (for 
the company and the individual). 
2.1.2 Gaps 
We conducted a large number of interviews within our own two universities, talking to programme 
managers, curriculum developers and course presenters. Our overall aim was to ascertain to what 
extent currently taught material ensured that graduates (in many specific disciplines): 
¥ were aware of the threats and risks that cybercrime and terrorism pose; 
¥ had appropriate knowledge to protect themselves and their organisations; 
¥ acquired relevant skills sufficient to safeguard themselves (and others). 
These discussions were held in the light of our findings from the first phase. We noted current good 
practice, and discussed apparent gaps with our interviewees.  
2.1.3 Recommendations 
Based on the findings gathered from the Needs and Gaps phases, a set of recommendations will be 
compiled with an aim to improve ways universities can support organisations to protect people, 
property and data. In particular, it is envisaged that new teaching approaches will be explored, for 
example by integrating key cyber security skills into university teaching across all disciplines in a 
holistic manner. 
2.1.4 Validation, Dissemination and Exploitation 
Our final phase is to return to the stakeholders: to the employers we consulted initially and to the 
educators that we interviewed. Feedback on our findings and preliminary recommendations will be 
used to correct any errors or omissions and to refine the conclusions. We are using digital media and 
other routes to disseminate these preliminary outcomes so that feedback is also available from the 
wider community (e.g. delegates to this conference).  
2.2 Methodology 
Phase 1 of the project was constructed around workshops with stakeholders in business and industry, 
with an emphasis on critical infrastructure. Data on issues and opinions was extracted from these 
workshops in a manner akin to voting Ð an issue raised by a delegate (on a yellow slip) thereby gained 
a ÒvoteÓ which other delegates could subsequently increment. Phase 2 was based on interviews with 
staff at the two universities, in which all interviews followed a structure dictated by a standard 
questionnaire. Data from the interviews was generated using an online questionnaire response form 
plus reports from the interviewers. On completion of phase 2 and its data analysis we will formulate a 
small set of key recommendations and test these out with our business stakeholders and academics, 
before wider dissemination takes place. 
2.2.1 Workshops 
Four workshops were organised during December 2014, February 2015, March 2015, and May 2015, 
mainly to fulfill the first phase (Needs) of the project. At the same time, these workshops also provided 
insights into the issues relevant to the second phase (Gaps) of the project. The title of the workshops 
was: ÒSecurity: ItÕs EveryoneÕs BusinessÓ. Two workshops took place at Staffordshire University and 
the other two at Newcastle University. The first three workshops followed a similar format. The main 
objective of these workshops was to gather the perceptions of industry representatives on what they 
saw as the key cyber and terrorism concerns and threats for organisations in general and critical 
infrastructure in particular. Workshop participants were also asked to focus on graduatesÕ awareness, 
understanding and skills required to deal with security, cybercrime, critical infrastructure and terrorism. 
The fourth workshop was organised in a different way to identify resources that already exist to deal 
with cybercrime and terrorism. These included the products, services, curriculum, qualifications and 
training available for this purpose. 
Delegates from Banking, Defence, Education, Health, Information Technology, Insurance, 
Management Consultancy, Police, Security Companies, Telecommunications, Transport, and Utilities 
sectors were represented at these workshops. 
Each workshop used a similar approach to elicit views from participants. Working in groups (set up to 
maximise diversity) the delegates were asked to discuss case studies and scenarios, and note down 
the security concerns they thought were relevant for their own organisations. All delegates then had 
an opportunity to consider the full set of issues identified, and add their own marker where applicable. 
Lastly, with strict confidentiality assured, delegates were asked to nominate significant gaps in 
protection from cyber and terrorist threats. 
The results obtained from the workshops are presented in Section 3. 
2.2.2 Interviews/Questionnaires 
In order to gauge the extent of university teaching that addresses cyber security and/or counter 
terrorism that is currently in place, we have carried out a university-wide, cross-faculty curriculum 
investigation and mapping exercise at both Staffordshire and Newcastle Universities. This exercise 
was conducted through a series of interviews involving directors of learning and teaching, programme 
managers, lecturing staff, as well as other university staff who have an interest in, and influence on, 
teaching. 
Our approach here was again straightforward. Starting from the projectÕs research questions (RQs), 
we created a small set of RQs specifically for the gaps analysis, and these were refined to give us the 
questions that were posed to our academic colleagues Ð in sum these questions were set to elicit 
information on the presence or absence of taught material relating to the threats and risks posed by 
cybercrime and terrorism. A first, and necessary, step was to obtain authorisation to go ahead from 
university management; no difficulties were encountered, Next, rather than simply present a bald 
questionnaire, we prepared a motivational preamble, and then solicited interviews with a targetted 
selection of university staff, covering the range of Schools and Faculties at both locations. We offered 
a 30 minute, structured interview session to go through our short questionnaire, with oral responses 
that could be discussed and clarified, and then requested submission of an online form so that the 
interviewees could send in their own considered responses, in their own words. Nevertheless, we 
retained notes taken at the interview, and wrote up interviewersÕ reports on these sessions, in order to 
preserve our own recollections of points made. 
2.2.3 Data collection and analysis 
The online submission route gives us a set of primary responses from a wide cross-section of 
academics covering both universities. These responses can be augmented (where appropriate and 
important) from our own reports Ð which although technically secondary we do not consider as inferior 
data. As project participants we may introduce some limited degree of bias, but against this we have a 
much clearer overall picture in which to embed the information we are given. Initial results from these 
responses, and the reports, are given in Section 3, next. 
Analysis to date has remained subjective; this is appropriate given that there are still a small number 
of interviews to be conducted (to take pragmatic account of diary scheduling difficulties over the hectic 
summer period). Indeed, we anticipate that most conclusions will remain subjective, although when 
the response data set is complete we will, of course, perform a quantitative analysis to extract any 
reinforcing numerical measurements. 
3 RESULTS 
In Section 3.1 we give a distillation of the results of our workshops on Needs Analysis (phase 1); this 
work is essentially complete. Section 3.2 provides a first statement of the outcomes from the Gaps 
analysis; since our interview programme (phase 2) is not fully completed these may be augmented 
later, but we have added to this section the views of our commercial/business stakeholders on Gaps, 
as expressed at the workshops. 
3.1 Needs Analysis 
The workshops have given us valuable insights into security concerns faced by organisations (more 
precisely, from the sectors enumerated in Section 2.2.1). We compiled the findings from the first three 
workshops and distilled them into nine themes: 
1. Lack of awareness/knowledge/skills: There was considerable recognition that many people are 
not fully aware of the risks of cybercrime and terrorism, and that there is a significant shortfall in 
knowledge and skills for dealing with these threats. This was seen as a current problem, but likely 
also to be the case for future graduates. 
2. Emerging trends and challenges: One of the most challenging themes identified concerns the 
rate and intensity of change in the ways security attacks are being made. But in addition, there are 
many Ð and major Ð areas of current concern, often due to technology advances and consequent 
changes to ways of working. 
3. Threats and risks: There are many ways in which someone with malicious intent can threaten a 
system, a business, users and society at large. The forms taken by these threats are often 
referred to as attack vectors (the route and method of attack). Concern clearly attaches to the 
risks associated with these attacks. 
4. Data protection: A major specific concern is the protection of data from unauthorised access, in 
order to maintain confidentiality, to protect the value of the data, to prevent misuse of the data, to 
ensure the data is not maliciously modified or deleted, and to prevent the insertion of invalid data, 
inappropriate content, or malware. 
5. Security culture and clash: When we consider safety issues, the importance of a Ôsafety cultureÕ 
is readily accepted. The prevalence of security breaches impacting on everyday life should lead to 
a similar recognition of the need for a pervasive Ôsecurity cultureÕ which treats protection from 
digital attack and terrorism as a fundamental need. 
6. Human related issues: Although almost all security concerns have their origin in decisions by 
people, the issues in this theme were seen as being immediately and directly related to human 
factors. 
7. Financial strategy relating to the costs of security: Costs are incurred to augment security and 
Ð especially for commercial enterprises Ð these costs are an obvious deterrent. Management has 
to make a difficult strategic decision on cost/benefit where estimates are very uncertain and 
resources may be strictly limited. 
8. Impact and consequences: As well as all of the concern for preventing security breaches, it is 
also necessary to consider the range of deleterious consequences, from loss of life and injury, 
environmental impact, financial losses, degradations of business and society. 
9. Policies and compliance: Growing concern by customers is leading to an increased need for 
compliance with a range of security standards and policy requirements. 
Of these themes, lack of awareness/knowledge/skills was deemed to be the most important, as 
indicated by the count of votes given by the participants of the workshops to the concerns raised 
(grouped subsequently into the nine themes above). The data count for each of the nine themes is 
presented in Table 1, while Fig. 2 provides a diagrammatic illustration of the same data expressed in 
percentage terms. 
Table 1. The nine themes of organisationsÕ concerns on security and related challenges  
Key Themes Count 
Lack of awareness/knowledge/skills 82 
Emerging trends and challenges 75 
Threats and risks 68 
Data protection 53 
Security culture and clash 36 
Human related issues 29 
Financial strategy relating to the costs of security 18 
Impact and consequences 15 
Policies and compliance 13 
 
Figure 2. The distribution of the key themes 
The workshops have also revealed potential measures to address these concerns, which can be 
grouped into: 
¥ education (count = 37) including training more people in IT skills, prevention by educating students 
about threats, and prevention by educating staff on how to look for and identify suspicious 
behaviour  
¥ awareness (18) including awareness of operational security issues, and spreading the message 
not just to the obvious stakeholders, but to everyone engaged with the organisation 
¥ system (15) including resilience of ICT systems and infrastructure 
¥ physical (11) including physical security of buildings and computers, as well as access controls 
Fig. 3 depicts what delegates at the SUCCEED workshops believed to be the most appropriate 
measures in tackling cyber security and terrorism challenges. 
 
Figure 3. The distribution of potential measures to address the challenges 
3.2 Gaps Analysis 
3.2.1 Findings from workshops 
In the first three workshops, the delegates were also asked to undertake an analysis of where gaps 
might occur in their organisationsÕ practice with regard to prevention, preparedness and consequence 
management, as well as to list gaps that currently exist in dealing with the scenarios that they had 
been presented with. These activities resulted in the identification of three main types of gaps: 
¥ Gaps in Society: mostly related to awareness (people who do not think that the threats are 
relevant to them Ð Òit happens to someone elseÓ), and understanding (people who are not aware 
of the risks in the digital era, where they have open access to smart phones, tablets and the like) 
¥ Gaps in Business/Organisations: dividing line between converts who are making a generational 
or paradigm shift and those focused on profitability and commerce who donÕt really care; 
entrepreneurs wanting only to Òrake money inÓ Ð they breach security systems and collect 
personal data for commercial exploitation (no ethics); and lack of employeesÕ understanding of 
responsibility for security, i.e. lack of security culture 
¥ Gaps in Government: not addressing the need to create a security culture 
The delegates were also asked to suggest potential ways to plug these gaps and who should be 
responsible to implement these, as summarised in Table 2. 
 Table 2. Addressing the gaps in security and counter terrorism provision 
Who How 
Higher 
Education 
Institutions 
¥ Undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, including teaching dynamic risk analysis (a 
model to assess risk which is constantly evolving), raise awareness of digital space and 
responsibility for own digital footprint and employersÕ requirements, and include security 
within teacher/lecturer training 
¥ Resources Ð produce a Sustainability Framework, including doorways for introducing 
security themes, a methodology for adopting and embedding a security culture, and 
dynamic risk analysis 
¥ Consultancy Ð provide for organisations, based on the premise: Threat + Vulnerability = 
Risk 
¥ Curriculum development: embed principles of cyber security and anti-terrorism within all 
courses, research jobs of the future, map out the IT skills gap and develop material to fill 
the gap, and develop relevant degree programme 
¥ Applied research: such as security for big data and psychology behind cybercrime and 
terrorism 
¥ Provide academic staff to employers for supervision/mentoring 
¥ Encourage a multi- and inter-disciplinary approach (it is not just for Computer Scientists) 
Schools ¥ Teach children to evaluate websites, social media in order to mitigate threats 
¥ Include security awareness in the National Curriculum (needs to be driven by the 
Government) 
Businesses and 
Organisations 
¥ Develop internal role of cyber security; need experienced staff as well as academic 
knowledge (could be resolved by extended apprenticeships) 
¥ Include security awareness and culture in Continuing Professional Development (CPD) for 
employees 
Governments ¥ Legislation to enable a security culture (as for Health and Safety, or Equality and 
Diversity) 
3.2.2 Findings from interviews 
Somewhat orthogonal (at least in terms of the means of data acquisition) to the information on gaps as 
perceived by the organisations at our workshops, is the information we have gleaned from the 
structured interviews of teaching staff (in particular, directors of learning and teaching, and lecturers) 
at the two universities. These interviews were to ascertain what was already being taught and Ð more 
importantly Ð what was not. We asked: 
¥ for background details of the role of the interviewee in teaching 
¥ whether their graduates ought to have an appreciation of the threats and risks of cybercrime and 
terrorism 
¥ for details of any programmes, modules or lectures that would increase a studentÕs awareness, 
understanding or skills relating to cybercrime/terrorism 
¥ about any future curriculum developments that would increase coverage of cybercrime/terrorism 
issues 
This effort is currently still ongoing, but a review of the questionnaires and interview reports obtained 
thus far enables some significant initial findings to be reported here: 
1. There was, essentially, universal agreement that it was highly desirable for all graduates emerging 
from academe to have an appropriate level of understanding about threats to critical infrastructure, 
organisations, society and themselves. 
2. With some notable exceptions, the responses have indicated quite limited (sometimes none) 
attention to cyber security and counter-terrorism in currently taught material. A standard response 
from a number of disciplines was along the lines of ÒThe syllabus is already very full; we must 
focus on material that is explicitly discipline based; these security-related issues are more about 
life-skills than discipline knowledgeÓ. 
3. More positively, in very many cases it was thought desirable and valuable to increase the 
prominence given to guidance and protection against cybercrime and terrorism during induction 
courses Ð though there is a risk that material covered at the outset of a 3-year programme may 
have been forgotten by graduation (the risk might be reduced by incorporating the material in a 
ÒhandbookÓ or by online provision, but the real solution to this problem is timely refreshment). 
4. We noted that varying levels of attention were paid to the cybercrime/terrorism issue during 
current induction courses. This suggests that a discussion of basic needs, conducted at University 
level and involving the central IT team, might be very worthwhile Ð especially if this led to a 
standard offering being made available with policy recommendations to back its inclusion. 
5. Rather more pointedly, we observed that when a School issues undergraduates with computing 
equipment for personal use, considerably more attention is paid to ensuring that the student is 
informed about security threats. 
6. There was widespread recognition and agreement that the employability of almost all graduates 
would not be at all hampered, and in some situations would be greatly enhanced, by the 
acquisition of security awareness and skills. This suggests that a discussion of skills and 
capabilities for employment, conducted at University level and involving the central Careers team, 
would be a worthwhile exercise, and would feed into any outcomes resulting from finding 4 above. 
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Although the work under the SUCCEED project is by no means complete, we feel vindicated that 
(i) the employers that we consulted all took the view that they would welcome the opportunity to 
recruit graduates with a stronger base in awareness, knowledge and skills concerning cyber 
crime and protection against terrorism, and  
(ii) the educators that we interviewed all agreed on the desirability of imparting that stronger base, 
though curriculum pressure was a strong counter to achieving it. 
Thus, our first recommendation will be that universities should give consideration to developing a 
policy on a basic common level of education and training in this area, developing content with input 
from security and IT specialists, and having due regard to graduate employability, employersÕ needs 
and (not least) the needs of society more generally. Further recommendations will emerge in due 
course. 
This project has been planned as a preliminary investigation; there is clearly scope for validating its 
eventual conclusions in other HEIs, in other countries, and also for research into how best to address 
the limitations and gaps we have identified (a range of different approaches can be proposed for this). 
And finally, project participants have recognised an Òadded valueÓ factor in our work, which stems from 
the different background of the team members at the two Universities. Experience at Newcastle is in 
engineering and technology for digital security, whereas at Staffordshire the skill set is grounded more 
broadly in sociological work. These different perspectives have made for instructive and thought 
provoking interaction. 
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